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ROBBING YOUR RIVAL’S PIGGYBANK:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT AFFIRMS BAD FAITH
DISMISSALS IN INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCIES AFTER
IN RE FOREVER GREEN ATHLETIC FIELDS, INC.
NATHAN L. RUDY*
“[T]he filing of an involuntary petition is an extreme remedy with seri-
ous consequences to the alleged debtor, such as loss of credit standing,
inability to transfer assets and carry on business affairs, and public
embarrassment.”1
I. CASHING IN A BAD DEBT: AN INTRODUCTION TO INVOLUNTARY
BANKRUPTCY
In September 2008, America experienced “[t]he most important
week in American financial history since the Great Depression . . . .”2  As a
result, anxiety levels were at an all-time high on Wall Street.3  However,
the economic crisis led to more than just an increase in anxiety; it also led
to an increase in involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed in the United
States.4  The amount of involuntary petitions filed rose because economic
hardship increased the risk of dissipating assets, and, consequently, people
* CPA, J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.S. 2012, Pennsylvania State University.  I would like to thank my family and
friends for their support and encouragement.  I am especially thankful to all those
who provided feedback and input on this Casebrief.  I would also like to thank the
staff of the Villanova Law Review and everyone who assisted in the publication of
this Casebrief.
1. In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing In re First Energy Leas-
ing Corp., 38 B.R. 577, 585 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McMeekin, 18 B.R. 177,
177–78 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)) (providing reason for careful scrutiny of creditors’
filing of involuntary petition).
2. See James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The Battle to Save the American Financial
System, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2009/09/21/eight-days [https://perma.cc/T9BC-STLV] (discussing se-
riousness of 2008 financial crisis).
3. See Michelle Castillo, Report: 2008 Financial Crisis Increased Suicide Rates in
U.S., Europe, CBS NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news
/report-2008-financial-crisis-increased-suicide-rates-in-us-europe/ [https://perma.
cc/RKC6-LYMW] (detailing research measuring “increased risk of depression and
anxiety” during Great Recession).
4. Compare James C. Duff, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES: MULTI-YEAR STATISTI-
CAL COMPILATIONS ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR
2008, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS 49 tbl.7.2 (Sept. 2009), available at www.
uscourts.gov/file/document/judicial-facts-and-figures-tables-2008 [https://perma.
cc/J3VM-9HJV] (finding 541 involuntary petitions filed in 2007), with U.S.
COURTS, Judicial Facts and Figures 2014 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/judicial-facts-and-figures-2014 [https://perma.cc/Y5C6-FZUR]
(finding 1,054 involuntary petitions filed in 2010).
(705)
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began to utilize the bankruptcy system, which has the “primary purpose”
of ensuring that a debtor’s assets are fairly utilized “for the collective bene-
fit of creditors.”5
Bankruptcy is often a beneficial avenue for debtors; however, debtors
often delay or are unwilling to file for bankruptcy voluntarily.6  Due to this
reluctance to file, the Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to “force” debtors
into bankruptcy in certain situations such as involuntary bankruptcies.7
Unlike voluntary bankruptcies, where the debtor files for bankruptcy, the
creditors file the petition in involuntary bankruptcies.8
Involuntary bankruptcies allow creditors who are able to meet certain
requirements a greater chance at procuring a favorable dissolution of the
debtor’s assets.9  Creditors who meet all of the requirements set forth in
11 U.S.C. § 303(b) can bring an involuntary bankruptcy petition only
under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.10  The requirements out-
5. See Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1419 (2003) (stating purpose of bankruptcy system).  Feibelman
goes on to explain that “[b]ankruptcy law should generally protect the value of
creditors’ claims, not their entitlement to particular assets.” See id.
6. See Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 84–85 (2012) (recognizing resistance against voluntary
bankruptcy despite benefits to debtors).  Under certain bankruptcy scenarios,
debtors could successfully reorganize if the debtor files for bankruptcy early; how-
ever, a debtor’s delay in filing often enhances the debtor’s financial distress and
makes reorganization impossible. See id. at 85 (describing problems when debtors
delay filing for bankruptcy).  However, debtors are often unwilling to declare
bankruptcy voluntarily for numerous reasons including “overly optimistic” atti-
tudes about their financial future or concerns about the stigma related to bank-
ruptcy. See id. (addressing reasons debtors delay seeking debt relief).
7. See id. (“Because the inclination of debtors to delay or avoid seeking debt
relief can frustrate the primary goals of bankruptcy, most bankruptcy regimes . . .
provide that debtors can be forced into bankruptcy involuntarily in at least some
circumstances.”).
8. Compare J. Kate Stickles & Patrick J. Reilley, The Nuts & Bolts of Involuntary
Bankruptcy, 27-JUN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (2008) (stating creditor commences
involuntary bankruptcy), with 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (noting debtors file volun-
tary bankruptcy petitions).
9. See 2 BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 13:109 (“Central policy behind involuntary
bankruptcy is to protect threatened depletion of assets or to ensure equal distribu-
tion of assets among creditors.”); see also Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for Amer-
ican States, supra note 6, at 83–84 (discussing benefits of bankruptcy).  An
involuntary bankruptcy “can help preserve” the assets of a failing debtor and en-
sure equitable allocation of those assets to all creditors. See id. (describing how
involuntary bankruptcy can benefit creditors).
10. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(1)–(2) (providing requirements for involuntary
bankruptcy).  Creditors can commence an involuntary bankruptcy case under the
following circumstances:
(1) by three or more entities, each of which is either a holder of a claim
against such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a
bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, or an indenture trustee repre-
senting such a holder, if such noncontingent, undisputed claims aggre-
gate at least $15,775 more than the value of any lien on property of the
debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims;
2
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lined in § 303(b) do not require a creditor to act in good faith; however,
in order to deter malfeasance, there is a bad faith provision that allows the
debtor to receive damages if the petition is dismissed and the creditor
acted in bad faith.11  Typically, courts have only addressed the bad faith
provision when a case is dismissed for a creditor’s failure to meet the re-
quirements of § 303(b).12  Recently, however, courts have been faced with
the issue of whether the bad faith provision applies only post-dismissal, or
whether a creditor’s petition may be dismissed solely for bad faith.13
In In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc.,14 the Third Circuit addressed
this gray area in the Bankruptcy Code.15  The decision clarifies the Bank-
ruptcy Code and establishes that creditors must act in good faith when
filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition.16  Additionally, the decision in-
stitutes a “totality of the circumstances” test for determining bad faith in
the Third Circuit.17  The decision also serves as a warning to creditors to
weigh their options before filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition.18
(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders, excluding any employee or
insider of such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable
under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, by one or
more of such holders that hold in the aggregate at least $10,000 of such
claims.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2) (detailing bad faith provision).  The provision
states:
If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on consent
of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the
right to judgment under this subsection, the court may grant judg-
ment . . . (2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith,
for—(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or (B) punitive
damages.
Id.
12. See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 333 (3d Cir.
2015) (discussing typical litigation surrounding bad faith provision in involuntary
bankruptcies).
13. See id. (“Less often litigated is the issue here, namely, whether bad faith
may serve as a basis for dismissal even where the criteria for commencing a suit are
satisfied and where the debtor is admittedly not paying its debts as they become
due.”).
14. 804 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2015).
15. See id. at 332–37 (detailing court’s precedential analysis involving bad
faith and involuntary bankruptcy proceedings); see also John Gotaskie, Ever Consid-
ered Filing an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition? Then You Need to Review This Case,
FRANCHISE L. UPDATE (Fox Rothschild, Phila., Pa) (Nov. 4, 2015), http://franchise
law.foxrothschild.com/2015/11/articles/legal-decisions/ever-considered-filing-an-
involuntary-bankruptcy-petition-then-you-need-to-review-this-case/?utm_source=
mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=view-Original [https://
perma.cc/RRP9-N82E] (discussing Third Circuit’s decision).
16. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 333–35 (finding bankruptcy code contains
bad faith requirement).
17. See id. at 336 (detailing totality of circumstances test for evaluating bad
faith as adopted by Third Circuit).
18. See Gotaskie, supra note 15 (urging future involuntary petition filers to
“carefully review the facts of their case” before filing).
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This Casebrief examines why the Forever Green decision represents a
victory for debtors and will impact future creditors’ decisions to file invol-
untary bankruptcy petitions.19  Part II discusses the role bad faith has
played throughout the history of involuntary bankruptcy before Forever
Green.20  Further, Part II summarizes the legal standards courts have used
to evaluate bad faith before Forever Green.21  Part III analyzes Forever Green,
details the facts and procedure of Forever Green, and describes the court’s
reasoning.22  Part IV examines the court’s acceptance of bad faith dismis-
sals for involuntary bankruptcies and analyzes the totality of the circum-
stances standard chosen by the court.23  Part V provides advice for future
bankruptcy practitioners in light of Forever Green.24  Finally, Part VI con-
cludes by addressing the impact Forever Green will have on future bank-
ruptcy litigation.25
II. BANKRUPTCY CODE GIVES COURTS BLANK CHECK TO DEAL WITH GOOD
FAITH PROVISION
In an attempt to encourage creditors to file involuntary bankruptcy
petitions before a debtor’s assets are depleted, Congress revamped bank-
ruptcy law with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.26  The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 provides the standards and requirements relating to
involuntary bankruptcy that govern modern bankruptcy law and is com-
monly referred to as the “Bankruptcy Code” or “the Code.”27  Congress
provided little guidance on how, or if it is even necessary, to apply a good
faith requirement to involuntary bankruptcy petitions, so courts have in-
19. For a further discussion of the reasons Forever Green represents a victory
for debtors and should impact practitioners, see infra notes 140–45 and accompa-
nying text.
20. For a further discussion of the role of bad faith in involuntary bankruptcy,
see infra notes 30–53 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the standards used to evaluate bad faith prior
to Forever Green, see infra notes 54–69 and accompanying text.
22. For a further analysis of the facts, procedural history, and holding in For-
ever Green, see infra notes 73–106 and accompanying text.
23. For further analysis of the court’s decision to uphold bad faith dismissals
and use the totality of the circumstances standard of bad faith, see infra notes
107–27 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of advice for future practitioners, see infra notes
128–45 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the impact of Forever Green, see infra notes
146–50 and accompanying text.
26. See Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why
the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 815–18 (1991) (discussing refor-
mation of Bankruptcy Code in 1978).  Per the suggestion of the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws, Congress “adopted the current ‘general failure to pay’ standard
in an effort to ease [ ] problems of proof” for creditors. See id. at 805 (describing
reason Congress “open[ed] up the standard for commencement of an involuntary
case so drastically”).
27. See id. at 803 n.2 (describing transformation of bankruptcy law into mod-
ern Bankruptcy Code).
4
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terpreted this requirement differently.28  Additionally, circuit courts have
differed regarding what standard to use when evaluating bad faith in invol-
untary bankruptcy petitions.29
A. Circuit Courts Try to Balance Their “Case Books” with Good Faith
Since the adoption of the Code in 1978, involuntary bankruptcies
have been governed by 11 U.S.C. § 303 and are available only in Chapter 7
or Chapter 11 cases.30  In order to file a petition, a creditor must satisfy
the requirements of one of the four subsections found in § 303(b).31  As
evidenced by § 303(b), Congress did not include the specific requirement
of good faith in any of the four subsections.32  The first two subsections of
§ 303(b) require creditors’ claims to aggregate at least $15,325 and estab-
lish limitations for how many creditors must file the petition, dependent
on how many creditors exist.33  The final two subsections of § 303(b) pro-
vide the requirements for partnerships and foreign entities.34  However,
Congress did include one reference to bad faith in § 303(i)(2), stating
“[i]f the court dismisses an involuntary petition, it may award damages
against any creditor ‘that filed the petition in bad faith.’”35  To add to the
28. For a further discussion of bad faith in involuntary bankruptcies, see infra
notes 30–53 and accompanying text.
29. For a further discussion of the standards used to evaluate bad faith in
involuntary bankruptcies, see infra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
30. See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 333 (3d Cir.
2015) (stating involuntary bankruptcies “under Chapter 7 and 11” are governed by
§ 303); see also Nicholas Gebelt, Involuntary Bankruptcy: What Is It, and Why Would
Anyone File One?, S. CAL. BANKR. L. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.southern
californiabankruptcylawblog.com/2012/01/13/involuntary-bankruptcy-what-is-it-
and-why-would-anyone-file-one/ [https://perma.cc/CR4A-Z4MT] (detailing rea-
sons involuntary bankruptcies may be brought only under Chapter 7 and 11).  The
Thirteenth Amendment bars involuntary bankruptcies from being filed under
Chapters 12 or 13 because “no individual . . . can be forced into a multi-year repay-
ment plan” using post-petitioned earnings. See id.  An individual is allowed to
bring an involuntary petition under Chapters 7 or 11 because these chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code are able to force liquidation, but not the repayment plans, which
can be considered violations of the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. (describing
proceedings under which involuntary petitions are allowed).  If a creditor is not
able to state a claim under Chapters 7 or 11, that creditor still has the option of
pursuing the claim outside of bankruptcy court. See Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv.
Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock), 772 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing cases
where bankruptcy courts held creditors with no “special need for bankruptcy relief
can go to state court to collect a debt”).
31. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(1)–(4) (2012) (listing four sets of requirements—
only one of which must be met—for filing involuntary petition).
32. See id. (omitting requirement of good faith).
33. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(1)–(2) (establishing if debtor has greater than
twelve creditors, three or more creditors must file petition; whereas, if debtor has
fewer than twelve creditors, only one debtor is required to file petition).
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(3)(A)–(B), (b)(4) (creating guidelines for part-
nerships and foreign representatives in involuntary petitions).
35. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 333 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2)) (noting
only one reference to bad faith appears in § 303).
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confusion regarding how courts are to incorporate bad faith into involun-
tary petitions, Congress did not define what constitutes bad faith; conse-
quently, bankruptcy and circuit “courts have developed different tests to
determine” what equates to bad faith.36  However, courts note that a good
faith requirement has “strong roots in equity” and aids in preventing
abuse of the bankruptcy process.37  Moreover, courts have agreed there is
a presumption of good faith in involuntary bankruptcies.38
Due to § 303(b)’s lack of reference to bad faith, most litigation re-
lated to bad faith in involuntary bankruptcy occurs when “the creditors do
not satisfy the § 303(b) requirements for filing the petition.”39  For exam-
ple, in In re Bayshore Wire Products Corp.,40 multiple creditors filed an invol-
untary petition against Bayshore Corporation under § 303(b)(1).41
However, the Second Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of
the case for failure to meet the requirements of § 303(b)(1) because only
two creditors were “holder[s] of a claim . . . that is not contingent as to
liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute . . . .”42  Because the creditors
failed to meet the requirements of § 303(b)(1), the Second Circuit then
analyzed whether the creditors acted in bad faith, ultimately concluding
the creditors did not.43
36. See Stickles & Reilley, supra note 8, at 56 (stating bad faith is not defined in
Bankruptcy Code and lack of definition leads to different judicial tests for bad
faith); see also In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 619 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (ac-
knowledging neither Bankruptcy Code nor court opinions provide definition for
bad faith).
37. See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The ‘good
faith’ requirement for Chapter 11 petitioners has strong roots in equity.”).
38. See id. at 169 (finding voluntary petition could be dismissed for lack of
good faith); see also In re Smith, 243 B.R. 169, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999) (finding
“presumption that petitioning creditors act in good faith” and that debtor “must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [creditor] filed . . . in bad faith”
(citing In re CLE Corp., 59 B.R. 579, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986))).  In Smith, one
creditor filed an involuntary petition against a debtor, but the court found the
creditor did not meet the requirements of § 303(b) because the creditor failed to
establish that Smith had less than twelve creditors. See id. at 189 (determining
creditor “failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that the number of . . . creditors
in this case was less than twelve”).  Because the creditor did not meet the require-
ments of § 303(b), the court evaluated whether the creditor acted in good or bad
faith and ultimately held the creditor acted in bad faith. See id. at 202 (describing
court’s holding).
39. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 333 (finding debtors often “file motions for
damages” due to bad faith under § 303(i)(2) after dismissal under § 303(b)).
40. 209 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2000).
41. See id. at 102–03 (detailing facts of case).
42. See id. at 103 (alteration in original) (explaining Second Circuit’s uphold-
ing of bankruptcy petition dismissal).  While the Second Circuit found the credi-
tors met the requirement of having more than three petitioners, the court
determined that only two of the creditor’s debts were not “the subject of a bona
fide dispute,” meaning the petition failed to meet all the requirements of
§ 303(b)(1). See id. 103–05 (providing court’s reasoning).
43. See id. at 105–07 (finding petitioners did not act in bad faith).  The Sec-
ond Circuit found that the creditors were not reckless and did not act in bad faith
6
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Circuit courts have reached different conclusions on how, or even if,
to apply a good faith requirement in involuntary bankruptcies.44  For ex-
ample, in In re WLB-RSK Venture,45 the Ninth Circuit found that “[i]f the
grounds for relief exist under Section 303, the good or bad faith of the
petitioning creditor appears irrelevant.”46  In WLB-RSK Venture, the court
determined the petition was properly dismissed because the requirements
of § 303(h)(1) were not met.47  However, the court noted that if the re-
quirements of § 303 were met, then the petition could not be dismissed
because any good or bad faith on the part of the creditor becomes
“irrelevant.”48
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit in In re Bock Transportation, Inc.49 found
that there is a good faith requirement for involuntary petitions and stated
that bad faith is reasonable grounds for dismissal.50  In Bock Transportation,
a sole petitioner filed an involuntary petition under § 303(b)(2) even
though the creditor did not meet those requirements.51  The Eighth Cir-
cuit granted the petition because the court found the creditor did not file
the petition in bad faith.52  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit and other bank-
when filing the petition because the creditor’s actions were insufficient to rebut
the presumption of good faith. See id. at 106 (“[W]e conclude that there is no basis
for a finding of bad faith under any of the tests currently in usage.”).  For a discus-
sion of the presumption of good faith, see supra notes 36–38 and accompanying
text.
44. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 334 (noting majority, but not all, courts agree
that “general ‘good faith’ filing requirement in the context of involuntary petitions
for bankruptcy[ ]” is necessary).  For a discussion on how other circuit courts, spe-
cifically the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts, have dealt with good faith in
involuntary bankruptcy, see infra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
45. 320 B.R. 221 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004).
46. See id. at *6 n.13 (discussing court’s rationale on bad faith inquiry).
47. See id. at *6 (explaining dismissal of petition).  The court found that the
requirements of § 303 were not met because the creditor did not show evidence of
the debtor’s failure to pay undisputed debts as they came due as required by
§ 303(h)(1). See id. (“Even assuming that this de minimus debt is undisputed, it is
not material enough under the totality of circumstances test to demonstrate that
[the appellant’s business] is not paying its undisputed debts as they become due,
particularly where [the appellant’s business] has no ongoing regular expenses.”
(citing In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001))).
48. See WLB-RSK Venture, 320 B.R. at *6 n.13.
49. 327 B.R. 378 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005).
50. See id. at 382 (noting implicit good faith requirement in involuntary
bankruptcy).
51. See id. at 379–80 (discussing factual history of case).  The debtor filed a
motion to dismiss the involuntary petition because in order for one sole creditor to
file under § 303(b)(2), the debtor must “ha[ve] fewer than twelve creditors”; how-
ever, here, the debtor had “more than twelve creditors.” See id. at 380–82 (describ-
ing court’s findings).
52. See id. at 382 (agreeing with Bankruptcy Court that “involuntary petition
was not filed for an improper purpose”).  The court did not find that the Bank-
ruptcy Court was “clearly erroneous or abused its discretion” when it held that the
creditor did not act in bad faith because the debtor promised to give a list of all
creditors to the petitioner but never fulfilled the promise. See id. at 381 (“[E]ven
7
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ruptcy courts have also determined a good faith requirement exists in in-
voluntary bankruptcies.53
B. Accounting for Bad Faith Requirements
Due to a lack of guidance from Congress, courts have been granted
broad latitude to interpret what constitutes bad faith.54  Consequently, nu-
merous standards to evaluate bad faith have arisen.55  These standards
vary in application; however, all of the standards are fact-intensive and
leave the evaluation of bad faith up to the bankruptcy court.56
Courts have traditionally utilized one of four standards to evaluate
bad faith.57  The first standard, the “improper use” test, seeks to deter-
mine whether “a petitioning creditor uses [the involuntary petition] in an
attempt to obtain ‘a disproportionate advantage.’”58  Bad faith exists
under this test when a creditor uses an involuntary petition as a collection
device instead of utilizing it “to protect against other creditors obtaining
though [the debtor] was under no obligation to provide a list of creditors, since it
had promised to do so, that promise should have been fulfilled.”).
53. See U.S. Optical, Inc. v. Corning Inc. (In re U.S. Optical, Inc.), No. 92-
1496, 1993 WL 93931, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 1993) (citing In re Winn, 49 B.R. 237,
239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985)) (stating courts must determine if petition “has been
filed in good faith”); see also In re Tichy Elec. Co., 332 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 2005) (agreeing with Eighth Circuit that Bankruptcy Code “contains an im-
plicit good faith requirement”); In re Manhattan Indus., Inc., 224 B.R. 195, 201
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 303.06, 303–38
(1997)) (noting involuntary petitions “must be made in good faith” and petitions
may be dismissed if filed in bad faith).
54. See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir.
2015) (“[W]e must decide on the standard for evaluating bad faith, which is not
defined in the Code.”); see also Lubow Machine Co. v. Bayshore Wire Prods. Corp.
(In re Bayshore Wire Prods. Corp.), 209 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[B]ad faith
is not defined in the bankruptcy code.” (quoting Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale Materi-
als Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1501 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted))); In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 179 (“[N]either the Code nor its
legislative history provides guidance regarding the content of the bad faith
standard.”).
55. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335 (noting “courts have applied a dizzying
array of standards” to evaluate bad faith).
56. See In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[W]e believe that ‘the
good faith inquiry is a fact intensive determination better left to the discretion of
the bankruptcy court.’” (quoting In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1355 (B.A.P. 7th Cir.
1992))).
57. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335–36 (naming four types of tests utilized by
courts).  Courts choose between utilizing one of the following tests: an “improper
use” test, an “improper purpose” test, an “objective test,” and a “totality of the
circumstances” test. See id. (describing tests).
58. See K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. at 179 n.14 (detailing improper use test); see also
Jaffe v. Wavelength, Inc. (In re Wavelength, Inc.), 61 B.R. 614, 619 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1986) (noting improper use test seeks to determine “whether the creditor’s actions
were an improper use of the Bankruptcy Code as ‘a substitute for customary collec-
tion procedures’” (quoting In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700, 703
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1984))).
8
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disproportionate advantages.”59  Similarly, the second standard, the “im-
proper purpose” test, also evaluates the subjective intent of the creditor
when the creditor files an involuntary petition.60  In this test, the court will
find bad faith exists if the creditor is motivated by “ill will, malice, or a
desire to embarrass or harass the alleged debtor.”61
Some courts opt to consider objective factors in their determination
and utilize either the “objective test” or the totality of the circumstances
test.62  The objective test measures bad faith by “assess[ing] what a reason-
able person would have believed and what a reasonable person would have
done in the creditor’s position.”63  The objective test also enables courts to
find bad faith where purely subjective tests such as the improper purpose
or improper use tests would not find bad faith.64
Finally, the totality of the circumstances test “effectively combines all
the tests and looks to both subjective and objective evidence of bad
faith.”65  The court determines bad faith under this test by weighing a
variety of factors, including “the reasonableness of petitioners’ actions, pe-
titioners’ motives and objectives, and the merits of petitioners’ view that
filing was appropriate.”66
59. See K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. at 179 n.14 (explaining bad faith exists under
improper use test when creditor “could have advanced its own interests in a differ-
ent forum” because creditor is seeking “disproportionate advantage” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
60. See Lubow Machine Co. v. Bayshore Wire Prods. Corp. (In re Bayshore
Wire Prods. Corp.), 209 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting intent of creditor in
filing involuntary petition is determinative factor under improper purpose test).
61. See id. (citing In re Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. 861, 864 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982)) (stating some courts have found bad faith through creditor’s intentions);
see also In re Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. at 864 (finding bad faith where involuntary
petition was filed for purpose of “spitefully forestall[ing] [ ] dissolution . . . and
frustrat[ing]” debtor).
62. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (describing four tests that exist to evalu-
ate bad faith).
63. See id. at 336 (citing In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. at 620) (detailing as-
sessment used by court during objective test).  The objective test does not focus on
the creditor’s personal intentions; however, the test focuses on “what a reasonable
person would have done in the creditor’s position.” See id.
64. See In re Grecian Heights Owners’ Ass’n, 27 B.R. 172, 173–74 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1982) (determining “purely subjective test” would find no bad faith exists in
case, but objective test concludes creditor acted in bad faith).  In Grecian Heights,
the court found the creditor did not act reasonably because the creditor disre-
garded the advice from twenty-five lawyers, who said not to file an involuntary peti-
tion, and instead decided to utilize the advice from one non-lawyer and filed an
involuntary petition. See id. at 174 (stating reasonable person would not act on
legal advice of person who is “not competent to give legal advice”).
65. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (citing Adell v. John Richards Homes
Bldg. Co. (In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co.), 439 F.3d 248, 255 n.2 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2006)) (describing totality of the circumstances test and detailing use of both
subjective and objective factors, such as what individual creditor actually believed
and what reasonable creditor would believe, in determination of bad faith).
66. See In re Cadillac by DeLorean & DeLorean Cadillac, Inc., 265 B.R. 574,
581 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (citing In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. D.
9
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Before Forever Green, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had never
addressed which test to use to evaluate bad faith in involuntary bankrupt-
cies.67  However, in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, the court previ-
ously adopted the totality of the circumstances test for determining bad
faith.68  As this might suggest, the jurisprudence in voluntary proceedings
affected how the court dealt with the bad faith element in Forever Green, an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.69
III. THIRD CIRCUIT PUTS ITS MONEY WHERE ITS MOUTH IS BY
UPHOLDING BAD FAITH DISMISSALS
In Forever Green, the Third Circuit first tackled the question of whether
bad faith is an appropriate ground for dismissal in involuntary bankrupt-
cies, finding creditors must act in good faith when filing bankruptcy peti-
tions.70  The creditor argued its “subjective motivations” for filing were
“irrelevant” as long as the objective criteria of § 303(b) were met.71  How-
ever, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the
involuntary petition due to bad faith.72
A. Breaking the Bank: Facts and Background of Forever Green
In 2005, Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. (Forever Green),
founded by Keith Day, sued ProGreen, owned by Charles Dawson, “for
diversion of corporate assets” (Pennsylvania litigation).73  Later in 2005,
Me. 1992)) (listing factors courts weigh to determine if bad faith exists); see also
Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (noting totality of the circumstances test involves
“fact-intensive review”).
67. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335 (“At the outset, we must decide on the
standard for evaluating bad faith, which is not defined in the Code.”).
68. See In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2007) (using totality of the
circumstances test in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings to determine if “Bank-
ruptcy Court’s decision to dismiss the bankruptcy case as a bad faith filing” was
abuse of discretion (citing In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir.
1999))).
69. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (acknowledging court took into consider-
ation jurisprudence of voluntary bankruptcies in Third Circuit).
70. See id. at 332–37 (discussing whether claim may be dismissed due to bad
faith filing).
71. See id. at 333 (detailing creditor’s argument that § 303 does not contain
good faith requirement).  The creditor in Forever Green argued the court should
order relief to be granted in the creditor’s favor regardless of the subjective moti-
vation of the creditor. See id. (“[The petitioning creditor claimed] a creditor’s
subjective motivations are irrelevant because § 303(b)(1) contains objective crite-
ria for who may file an involuntary petition, and if they are satisfied, § 303(h)(1)
provides that the court ‘shall order relief’ against a debtor who is not paying its
debts.”).
72. See id. at 338 (affirming district court’s holding).
73. See id. at 330 (providing background to case).  Forever Green sued
ProGreen for $5,000,000. See id. (discussing amount sought in Pennsylvania litiga-
tion).  Additionally, Charles Dawson was a former employee of Forever Green, and
he “would be liable if damages [were] awarded in [Forever Green’s] lawsuit”
10
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Charles and Kelli Dawson, Charles’ wife, “sued Forever Green for unpaid
commissions and wages in Louisiana” and the court referred to this litiga-
tion as the “Louisiana litigation.”74  In 2011, the Louisiana litigation re-
sulted in a “judgment in favor of the Dawsons” worth approximately
$300,000.75  Prior to the Louisiana litigation judgment, both Dawson and
Day “agreed to arbitrate the[ ] claim” in the Pennsylvania litigation.76
However, upon obtaining a judgment in the Louisiana litigation,
“ProGreen filed a motion to terminate the arbitration” in the Pennsylvania
litigation.77
After ProGreen filed its motion to terminate arbitration, Dawson
transferred the Louisiana litigation judgment to Pennsylvania, and the
Pennsylvania arbitrator subsequently suspended arbitration.78  Conse-
quently, Forever Green brought suit in state court “to reinstate [ ] arbitra-
tion,” in what was referred to as the “Philadelphia action,” and the judge
in the Philadelphia action required briefing on the issues.79  Instead of
submitting a brief, “the Dawsons and the law firm . . . which was owed
$206,000 from Forever Green, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition against Forever Green.”80  In response, Forever Green filed a mo-
against ProGreen because he was “an owner of ProGreen.” See id. (describing fac-
tual background).
74. See id. (describing second action brought in 2005 between Dawson and
Forever Green).
75. See id. at 331 (discussing outcome of Louisiana litigation).  The Louisiana
court entered a judgment that included “interest and other costs” that “total[ed]
more than $300,000,” and as of 2015, Forever Green had not paid any part of the
judgment. See id. (describing circumstances leading up to Forever Green case).
76. See id. (“While the Louisiana [litigation] was still running its course, the
parties to the [Pennsylvania litigation] agreed to arbitrate their claims.”).
77. See id. (explaining that in ProGreen’s motion to terminate arbitration,
ProGreen stated “it has become clear that [Forever Green] is insolvent and that
Keith Day does not have the ability or desire to pay the Arbitrator’s fees and ex-
penses” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78. See id. (detailing transfer of judgment to Louisiana).  Along with the trans-
fer of the Louisiana litigation judgment to Pennsylvania, ProGreen also obtained a
writ of execution against the arbitrator and the arbitrator’s law firm, but, because
the arbitrator’s fees were in danger, the arbitrator decided it was best to “sus-
pend[ ] arbitration until the fee issue was resolved.” See id. (providing factual back-
ground information).
79. See id. (detailing litigation brought by Forever Green in Philadelphia).
Day testified he filed the Philadelphia action “because Charles Dawson and his
counsel were determined to derail the arbitration” in the Pennsylvania litigation.
See id.  (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing Day’s reasoning for filing
Philadelphia action).  Day also stated Dawson “‘threatened to put [Forever Green]
into bankruptcy’” unless Forever Green “agree[d] to terminate the arbitration.”
See id. (alteration in original).
80. See id. (detailing Chapter 7 involuntary bankruptcy petition filed against
Forever Green).  Charles Dawson, Kelli Dawson, and the law firm Cohen Seglias
Pallas Greenhall & Furman filed the involuntary petition and satisfied the criteria
for commencing a suit under § 303(b) because “(1) they are three creditors,
(2) they each hold an uncontested claim against Forever Green, and (3) their
claims aggregate at least $15,325 more than the value of liens on Forever Green’s
11
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tion to dismiss the petition for bad faith, claiming the petition was an
abuse of the bankruptcy process and was “initiated . . . to frustrate the
prosecution of the Forever Green’s claims against Mr. Dawson.”81
During the bankruptcy proceeding, the court determined that For-
ever Green had over fifty creditors, Day was slowly paying off debts on
behalf of Forever Green, and there were creditors “ahead of [the Daw-
sons] in the [financial] pecking order.”82  Ultimately, the Bankruptcy
Court granted the motion to dismiss for bad faith and determined Dawson
filed the petition “in furtherance of an improper bankruptcy purpose.”83
The Bankruptcy Court determined Dawson acted in bad faith because he
filed the “petition for two improper purposes: (1) to frustrate [Forever
Green’s] efforts to litigate its claims against the ProGreen Parties; and
(2) to force Mr. Day to pay on behalf of [Forever Green] the amounts due
to the Dawsons pursuant to the Consent Judgment.”84  Subsequently, the
district court affirmed the dismissal, and the Dawsons appealed the case to
the Third Circuit.85
B. Regulating the Market: The Third Circuit’s Analysis in Forever Green
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion, holding that
bad faith is a sufficient ground for dismissal in involuntary bankruptcies.86
property.” See id. at 331–32 (describing three statutory criteria creditors met in
order to “commenc[e] an involuntary bankruptcy case”).  Charles Dawson justified
the decision to file the involuntary bankruptcy petition because the petition was
the best way to get Forever Green’s assets. See id. at 331 (providing Dawson’s rea-
son for filing involuntary bankruptcy petition).
81. See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. (Forever Green Bankruptcy I),
500 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (providing Forever Green’s rationale for
filing motion to dismiss), aff’d, 514 B.R. 768 (E.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 804 F.3d 328 (3d
Cir. 2015).
82. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 332 (referencing factual findings during For-
ever Green Bankruptcy I).  The bankruptcy court determined that, since 2012, For-
ever Green had been winding down its operations and “its operating account had
no activity.” See id. (“[I]n 2012, its operating account had no activity and its bal-
ance never exceeded $30.”); see also Forever Green Bankruptcy I, 500 B.R. at 427 (de-
tailing extensive list of Forever Green’s creditors).
83. See id. at 430 (stating Bankruptcy Court’s holding in Forever Green Bank-
ruptcy I).  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals provided several scenarios where bad
faith would be present, including the filing of a petition “to collect on a personal
debt, to gain an advantage in pending litigation, or to harass the debtor.” See For-
ever Green, 804 F.3d at 332 (providing examples of creditors acting in bad faith).
84. See Forever Green Bankruptcy I, 500 B.R. at 426–27 (noting Bankruptcy Court
utilized totality of the circumstances test but focused on improper purposes of
Dawson).  The Bankruptcy Court found that, even though the § 303(b) criteria
were met, the motion to dismiss could still be granted because of Dawson’s bad
faith. See id. at 430.
85. See Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Dawson, 514 B.R. 768, 790 (E.D.
Pa. 2014) (providing procedural history of case).  The Dawsons appealed the case
without the law firm. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 332 (explaining which parties
appealed).
86. See id. at 338 (“[T]he record supports the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to
dismiss the petition as a bad-faith filing.”).
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The court acknowledged the four possible standards to evaluate bad faith
and ultimately chose the totality of the circumstances test as the proper
standard for involuntary bankruptcies going forward.87
1. Approving Bad Faith Dismissals
Addressing bad faith dismissals, the court acknowledged that § 303
contains only one reference to bad faith—in § 303(i)(2).88  With this in
mind, the principal issue posed to the court was “whether bad faith may
serve as a basis for dismissal even where the criteria for commencing a suit
are satisfied and where the debtor is admittedly not paying its debts as they
become due.”89  The Third Circuit found that bad faith was not limited to
“assessing damages after a petition has been dismissed” for not meeting
the objective criteria of § 303.90  The court reasoned that complying with
§ 303 is only the “first hurdle” in an involuntary bankruptcy.91  The court
also stated that Congress’s express reference to bad faith in § 303(i)(2)
showed intent “for bad faith to serve as a basis for both dismissal and dam-
ages.”92  Furthermore, the court concluded that Congress’s use of the
words “only if” in § 303(h)(1) implied that the objective criteria were “nec-
essary but not sufficient” factors in involuntary bankruptcy petitions.93
87. See id. at 335–36 (describing four standards courts use to evaluate bad
faith and “adopt[ing] the ‘totality of the circumstances’ standard for determining
bad faith under § 303”).  See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text for a
description of all four tests and factors that influenced the Third Circuit’s choice
of standard.
88. See id. at 333 (“[T]he only mention of bad faith is in § 303(i)(2) . . . .”).
89. See id. (acknowledging requirements of § 303 were met and issue
presented to court was whether bad faith as referred to in § 303(i) was grounds for
dismissal).  For a further discussion of the sole reference to bad faith in § 303,
found in § 303(i)(2), see supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
90. See id. 333–34 (rejecting argument that bad faith cannot serve “as a basis
for dismissal”).  The court rejected the argument that satisfying the requirements
of § 303(b) “forecloses bad faith dismissals.” See id. at 334.
91. See id. (expanding upon requirements of involuntary bankruptcies).  The
court compared satisfying § 303(b)(1) to “pleading a prima facie case in many
actions.” See id. (noting that “if the three requirements [of 303(b)(1)] are satis-
fied, that doesn’t mean the bankruptcy court can’t dismiss the case”).
92. See id. (discussing legislative intent behind § 303).  In contrast to the Daw-
sons’ reading of § 303, that a court may analyze bad faith only after dismissal for
not complying with § 303, the court found “no reason why the Code would permit
the imposition of damages . . . for bad-faith filings but not allow the same con-
duct—such as using involuntary bankruptcy as a litigation tactic in pending pro-
ceedings—to provide a basis for dismissing the petition.” See id.
93. See id. (explaining statutory language does not support Dawsons’ claims).
Section 303(h)(1) states:
(h) If the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief
against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which
the petition was filed. Otherwise, after trial, the court shall order relief
against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which
the petition was filed, only if . . . .
13
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The Third Circuit continued its analysis, explaining that excluding a
bad faith analysis in involuntary bankruptcy would “overlook[ ] the equita-
ble nature of bankruptcy.”94  The court reiterated that “bankruptcy courts
are equipped with the doctrine of good faith” in order to ensure integrity
and “patrol the border between good- and bad-faith filings.”95  The court
acknowledged the “majority of courts agree” on a general good faith re-
quirement in involuntary bankruptcies.96  Moreover, the court found al-
lowing dismissals for bad faith reinforced the principle that involuntary
bankruptcies should be brought for the proper reasons and not simply to
punish the debtor.97
(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such debts
become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to
liability or amount.
11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (2012).  The Third Circuit implied that Congress would
have used “if” or “if and only if” instead of “only if” had it intended for the objec-
tive criteria of § 303 to be the sole requirements that petitioners must meet to
bring an involuntary bankruptcy petition successfully. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at
334 (“An ‘if’ or ‘if and only if’ clause would have been more favorable to the
[creditors].”).
94. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 334.  According to the court, the good faith
requirement “ensures that the Bankruptcy Code’s careful balancing of interests is
not undermined by petitioners whose aims are antithetical to the basic purposes of
bankruptcy.” See id. (quoting In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108,
119 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See id. (finding equitable power of bankruptcy court should  be “available
only to those debtors and creditors with ‘clean hands’” (quoting In re Little Creek
Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986))).
96. See id. at 334 & n.5 (providing examples of other courts that agree with
use of good faith doctrine in involuntary bankruptcy petition cases); see also In re
Bock Transp., Inc., 327 B.R. 378, 381 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (citing Basic Elec.
Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 769 F.2d 483, 486 (8th Cir. 1985)) (ex-
plaining bad faith may be “cause for the dismissal of a petition”); U.S. Optical, Inc.
v. Corning Inc. (In re U.S. Optical, Inc.), No. 92-1496, 1993 WL 93931, at *3 (4th
Cir. Apr. 1, 1993) (citing In re Winn, 49 B.R. 237, 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985))
(stating “[c]ourts are duty bound . . . to determine whether an involuntary petition
has been filed in good faith . . . . [b]ad faith filings are to be dismissed”); In re
Manhattan Indus., Inc., 224 B.R. 195, 201 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (stating
“[d]ismissal is one possible consequence” for filing petition in bad faith).
97. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335 (stating “[p]olicy considerations lend
further support” to bad faith dismissals).  The court reiterated that “ ‘involuntary
petition[s] [are] [ ] extreme remed[ies] with serious consequences to the alleged
debtor, such as loss of credit standing, inability to transfer assets and carry on busi-
ness affairs, and public embarrassment.’” See id. (quoting In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945,
946 (7th Cir. 1985)).  Further, requiring petitions to be filed in good faith would
“encourage creditors to file petitions for proper reasons such as to protect against
the preferential treatment of other creditors or the dissipation of the debtor’s as-
sets[,]” thus limiting the improper imposition of “serious consequences” of invol-
untary bankruptcies on debtors. See id. (citing In re Silverman, 230 B.R. 46, 53
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1998)) (providing further support for imposing good faith filing
requirement).
14
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2. Determining Proper Standard to Evaluate Bad Faith
The court in In re Forever Green accepted the totality of the circum-
stances test as the appropriate standard for evaluating bad faith in involun-
tary bankruptcies.98  Following the Sixth Circuit’s guidance, the Third
Circuit determined the totality of the circumstances standard “effectively
combines all the tests” used by courts to determine bad faith.99  Addition-
ally, the court offered a non-exhaustive list of factors to examine in meet-
ing the totality of the circumstances standard.100
Utilizing this newly adopted standard, the Third Circuit upheld the
bankruptcy court’s dismissal for bad faith.101  The court determined that
Dawson used the involuntary petition as a “weapon for stopping the arbi-
tration and cashing in on the consent judgment.”102  Emphasizing the eq-
98. See id. at 336 (adopting totality of the circumstances standard for bad
faith).  The court stated the totality of the circumstances standard is the “most
suitable for evaluating the myriad ways in which creditors filing an involuntary
petition could act in bad faith.” See id. (explaining benefits of totality of the cir-
cumstances standard).  The court also noted the Third Circuit applies “the same
standard” when evaluating voluntary bankruptcy petitions. See id. (identifying
other supportive factors for choosing totality of the circumstances test).
99. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (citing Adell v. John Richards Homes
Bldg. Co. (In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co.), 439 F.3d 248, 255 n.2 (6th Cir.
2006)) (recognizing Sixth Circuit’s use of totality of the circumstances standard).
The Sixth Circuit explained that courts may consider an “improper use,” an “im-
proper purpose,” and the applicable Bankruptcy Code standards when employing
the totality of the circumstances test. See In re John Richards Home Bldg. Co., 439 F.3d
at 255 n.2.
100. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (identifying potential factors to con-
sider).  The court provided several relevant factors:
[W]hether[ ] the creditors satisfied the statutory criteria for filing the pe-
tition; the involuntary petition was meritorious; the creditors made a rea-
sonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law before filing;
there was evidence of preferential payments to certain creditors or of dis-
sipation of the debtor’s assets; the filing was motivated by ill will or a
desire to harass; the petitioning creditors used the filing to obtain a dis-
proportionate advantage for themselves rather than to protect against
other creditors doing the same; the filing was used as a tactical advantage
in pending actions; the filing was used as a substitute for customary debt-
collection procedures; and the filing had suspicious timing.
Id.
101. See id. (“[T]he Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Charles Dawson filed the involuntary petition in bad faith.”).  According to
the Third Circuit, the Bankruptcy Court was justified in this conclusion because it
determined that “Dawson’s prepetition conduct indicates that his litigation strat-
egy was to use any means necessary to force the payment of the Consent Judgment
and the abandonment of Forever Green’s claims against [ProGreen].” See id. (al-
teration in original) (quoting Forever Green Bankruptcy I, 500 B.R. 413, 427 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d, 514 B.R. 768 (E.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 804 F.3d 328 (3d Cir.
2015)).
102. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 337 (discussing Dawson’s improper motives
for filing involuntary petition).  The court found that “Dawson and his counsel
said they would keep the arbitration suspended until Forever Green paid on the
consent judgment.  They also threatened to file an involuntary petition unless For-
ever Green agreed to stop the proceedings[,]” a threat on which Dawson followed
15
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uitable nature of involuntary bankruptcy, the court explained “Dawson’s
actions ran counter to the spirit of collective creditor action that should
animate an involuntary filing.”103  Additionally, the court found Dawson
did not properly “engage[ ] in the type of due diligence and sober deci-
sion-making process that should precede any involuntary filing.”104  Ac-
cording to the court, if he had, he would have learned Forever Green was
not dissipating assets and therefore, would not have brought the action.105
Thus, taking into consideration all of these circumstantial factors, the
court found Dawson’s actions constituted bad faith.106
IV. PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS: ANALYZING BAD FAITH IN INVOLUNTARY
BANKRUPTCIES IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT AFTER FOREVER GREEN
In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit tackled the issue of
whether to allow bad faith dismissals in involuntary bankruptcies, and in
the process, increased the burden on involuntary petitioners to file in
good faith.107  Overall, this new precedent is appropriate for involuntary
bankruptcy for two reasons.108  First, by allowing bad faith dismissals, the
through. See id. at 336 (describing Dawson’s tactics behind filing involuntary
petition).
103. See id. (providing rationale of Third Circuit’s finding of bad faith).  The
court found that Dawson put his interests before those of other creditors when he
filed the petition and halted arbitration in the Pennsylvania litigation. See id. (“By
trying to end the arbitration, Dawson was obstructing Forever Green from pursu-
ing its largest asset, the potential proceeds of which Forever Green could have
used to pay its creditors.”).  Moreover, Dawson attempted to use the bankruptcy
process to leapfrog “other [higher-priority] creditors” in order to be paid first by
Forever Green. See id. 336–37 (“Courts routinely find it improper for creditors to
use the bankruptcy courts to gain a personal advantage in other pending actions
or as a debt-collection device.”).
104. See id. at 337 (detailing court’s conclusion that Dawson did not partici-
pate in “sober decision-making process”).
105. See id. (describing Dawson’s decision making process).  The court con-
cluded that if Dawson had actually “done an investigation prior to filing” the invol-
untary petition, “he would have learned that Forever Green was not making
preferential payments to its creditors” and there was no “evidence of Forever
Green’s assets depleting.” See id. (explaining steps Dawson should have taken
before filing petition).
106. See id. at 336–37 (explaining how Dawson acted in bad faith).  After re-
viewing the facts, the court determined that Dawson acted in bad faith due to his
lack of due diligence, improper motive for filing the involuntary petition, and im-
proper use of the bankruptcy process. See id. at 337 (“Accordingly, the record
supports the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to dismiss the petition as a bad-faith
filing.”).
107. See James H. Haithcock III & Robert C. Goodrich, Jr., Bad News, Will
Travel Fast: Third Circuit Imposes “Good Faith” Condition on Involuntary Bankruptcy Peti-
tioners, 2015 NO. 12 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER NL 1, Dec. 2015, at 1, 1 (noting
Third Circuit characterized as matter of first impression its decision that “ ‘bad
faith’ justifies dismissing an involuntary petition . . . and that bad faith is deter-
mined by a ‘totality of the circumstances’”).
108. For a further discussion of the two reasons the new precedent is appro-
priate for involuntary bankruptcies, see infra text of notes 108–10.
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Third Circuit appropriately adhered to the primary purpose and policy
considerations of the bankruptcy process.109  Second, adopting the totality
of the circumstances standard for evaluating bad faith provides the Third
Circuit with the most comprehensive test for bad faith.110
A. Void for Lack of Good Faith: Examining the Third Circuit’s Allowance of
Bad Faith Dismissals in Involuntary Bankruptcies
By allowing bad faith dismissals, the Third Circuit aligned itself with
the majority of courts dealing with bad faith dismissals in involuntary
bankruptcies.111  The first hurdle the Third Circuit faced was overcoming
the limited reference to bad faith in § 303.112  While the Code does not
explicitly require that petitioners act in good faith, the court interpreted
an inherent good faith requirement.113
First, the court’s non-limiting interpretation of § 303—to view Con-
gress’s “express reference” to bad faith in § 303 as an indication that “Con-
gress intended for bad faith to serve as a basis for both dismissal and
damages”—fits properly with the all-encompassing language of § 303.114
Second, aside from the textual interpretation of § 303, the primary goal of
involuntary bankruptcy—“equitable distribution of the assets of the al-
leged debtor among all his creditors”—supports an allowance of dismissals
for bad faith.115  If the Third Circuit had disallowed bad faith dismissals,
109. For a further discussion of the purposes and policy considerations of the
bankruptcy process, see supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
110. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (noting totality of the circumstances
standard “effectively combines all [other] tests and looks to both subjective and
objective evidence of bad faith”).  For a further discussion of the benefits of the
approach set forth in Forever Green, see infra notes 119–27 and accompanying
text.
111. For a further discussion of the circuit split relating to bad faith dismissals
in involuntary bankruptcies, see supra notes 44–53 and accompanying text.
112. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 333 (discussing limited reference to bad
faith in § 303).  The court noted § 303 has one reference to bad faith that seems to
relate to damages awarded post-dismissal. See id. (“[B]ecause the only mention of
bad faith is in § 303(i)(2) and deals with post-dismissal damages, the vast majority
of litigation concerning bad faith centers on that provision.”).  Additionally, Con-
gress did not explicitly state a specific requirement of good faith in § 303. See
generally 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) (omitting requirement of good or bad faith other
than bad faith in regards to post-dismissal damages).
113. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 334 (finding petitioners must file involun-
tary petitions in good faith).
114. See id. at 333 (noting Congress could have limited § 303’s scope by using
terms “if” or “if and only if,” rather than “only if”); see also Block-Lieb supra note 26,
at 815–17 (explaining Congress followed incorporated suggestions from “the Com-
mission on Bankruptcy Laws” when it drafted Bankruptcy Code and “the Commis-
sion viewed a liberal standard for bringing an involuntary case as good policy”).
For a further discussion of Congress’s word choice, see supra note 92–93 and ac-
companying text.
115. See In re Arker, 6 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing In re
Blount, 142 F. 263 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1906); Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182
U.S. 438 (1901)) (stating objective of involuntary bankruptcy); see also In re Central
17
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the court would have effectively disregarded this objective by prioritizing a
bad faith creditor’s claim above those of all other creditors.116  Further-
more, given the “serious consequences” of bankruptcy, the court convinc-
ingly demonstrated the need for a good faith requirement to ensure
bankruptcy petitions are brought for the proper reasons.117  Thus, by
prohibiting bad faith dismissals, the court prevented creditors from simply
filing petitions in retaliation or for the purpose of gaining an unfair
advantage.118
Hobron Assocs., 41 B.R. 444, 452 (D. Haw. 1984) (discussing “fresh start” for debt-
ors and “orderly ranking of creditors’ claims” as policy considerations behind
bankruptcy system); Scott E. Blakely, A Proper Purpose for Commencing an Involuntary
Bankruptcy Petition: Preserving a Preference Action, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INVOL-
UNTARY BANKRUPTCY FILINGS (Blakeley, LLP, L.A., Cal.) (May 2, 2011), http://www.
blakeleyllp.com/content/2011/05/02/a-proper-purpose-for-commencing-an-invol
untary-bankruptcy-petition-preserving-a-preference-action/ [https://perma.cc/M2
64-GDD3] (“The historic purpose of involuntary bankruptcy is to provide vendors
with a means of assuring equal distribution of the debtor’s assets.”).
116. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 334 (noting good faith requirement pro-
motes “equitable nature of bankruptcy”).  The court emphasized that the good
faith requirement allows for the interest of one improperly motivated creditor not
to be advanced to the detriment of the other creditors. See id. (“At its most funda-
mental level, the good faith requirement ensures that the Bankruptcy Code’s care-
ful balancing of interests is not undermined by petitioners whose aims are
antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy.” (quoting In re Integrated
Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted))); see also Gotaskie, supra note 15 (emphasizing need for “collective fac-
tors that benefit all creditors” if petition is brought to serve individual creditor’s
collection efforts).
117. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335 (noting “serious consequences” of invol-
untary bankruptcy petitions and potential harms caused by petitions filed for im-
proper reasons); see also In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“[A] good faith standard protects the jurisdictional integrity of the bankruptcy
courts by rendering their equitable weapons . . . available only to those debtors and
creditors with clean hands.” (quoting Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth
Mort. Corp., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted))); see also Brad E. Godshall & Peter M. Giluhy, The Involuntary Bankruptcy Peti-
tion: The World’s Worst Debt Collection Device?, 53 BUS. LAW. 1315, 1317–18 (1998)
(detailing good faith requirement in involuntary petitions and noting involuntary
petitions are “extreme remed[ies] with serious consequences”).  For a further dis-
cussion of potential consequences of involuntary bankruptcies, see supra note 1
and accompanying text.
118. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335 (noting proper purposes for involuntary
bankruptcies).  The court acknowledged that the prevention “against the preferen-
tial treatment of other creditors or the dissipation of the debtor’s assets” consti-
tuted proper motivations for filing involuntary petitions. See id. (citing In re
Silverman, 230 B.R. 46, 53 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998)) (identifying proper reasons to file
involuntary bankruptcy petitions); see also Blakely supra note 115 (explaining bad
faith filings may be dismissed for improper purposes such as “to gain settlement
leverage” or “as a substitute for customary collection proceedings”).
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B. Checking All the Boxes: Analyzing the Third Circuit’s Adoption of a
Totality of the Circumstances Standard
After allowing for bad faith dismissals, the Third Circuit faced the
challenge of evaluating bad faith without statutory guidance.119  The court
appropriately adopted the totality of the circumstances test as the proper
standard because it “combines all the other tests and looks to both subjec-
tive and objective evidence of bad faith.”120  The “objective prong of [the
test] requires the debtor to prove that the [petitioner] conducted a rea-
sonable inquiry into the law and the facts surrounding the case prior to
filing the involuntary petition.”121  Conversely, the subjective prong seeks
to determine whether the petitioner filed a petition “to achieve an im-
proper purpose.”122  Consequently, utilizing both subjective and objective
factors enables the Third Circuit to assess a creditor’s motivation—a key
aspect in determining whether someone acted in bad faith—but also
other equitable factors to ensure no malfeasance is committed.123
119. See Lubow Machine Co. v. Bayshore Wire Prods. Corp. (In re Bayshore
Wire Prods. Corp.), 209 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (acknowledging “‘bad faith’
is not defined in bankruptcy code, and [ ] there is no legislative history addressing
the intended meaning of this language”); see also In re Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. 861,
864 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (“Bad faith is a term of art undefined in the Bank-
ruptcy Code.”).
120. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (citing In Re John Richards Bldg.
Homes Co. (In re John Richards Bldg. Homes Co.), 439 F.3d 248, 255 n.2 (6th Cir.
2006)) (finding “[totality of the circumstances test] is most suitable” for assessing
bad faith); see also Bruce Nathan & Eric Chafetz, Petitioning Creditors Beware: A Bad
Faith Filing Can Sink an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition, BUS. CREDIT (Lowenstein,
N.Y.C., NY) 2–3 (Feb. 2016), https://www.lowenstein.com/files/Publication/5062
de1c-e131-4f02-8639-40cfbf3cc6db/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/84be72
35-3ef4-443d-9b97-436d312d176d/BC-Feb16_NathanChafetz.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8EYJ-QZLU] (detailing future creditors need to ensure all petitioners in invol-
untary filing analyze their filing under totality of the circumstances test); see also
Gotaskie, supra note 15 (acknowledging creditors filing involuntary petition should
ensure that “considering the totality of the circumstances, there are at worst neu-
tral reasons for the filing”).
121. Godshall & Giluhy, supra note 117, at 1330 (describing objective prong
of bad faith review in involuntary bankruptcy).  The authors note that the “objec-
tive requirement of good faith is typically discussed by the courts in conjunction
with an analysis of whether an originally defective involuntary petition can be
amended.” See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) and cases interpreting the stat-
ute’s good faith requirement) (describing courts’ use of objective prong in invol-
untary petitions).
122. See id. (citing case law demonstrating subjective aspect of bad faith review
in involuntary bankruptcy).  Godshall and Giluhy also note that an example of an
improper purpose that would fail the subjective bad faith test would be a creditor’s
filing of an involuntary petition for the sole purpose of “injur[ing] a competitor.”
See id. (providing example of improper purpose that would fail subjective part of
bad faith inquiry).
123. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (noting suitability of totality of the cir-
cumstances test); see also In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 180 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992)
(finding that “objective and subjective factors should be considered” when deter-
mining whether bad faith exists).
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While the court adopted the “most suitable” standard for evaluating
bad faith, the totality of the circumstances test does not create a bright-line
rule for what constitutes bad faith.124  The standard combines many differ-
ent factors in a “fact-intensive review” and creates a gray area regarding
whether a court will find the existence of bad faith.125  Still, this standard
is the only one that fairly weighs all of the creditor and debtor’s inter-
ests.126  While other standards may offer more of a bright-line approach,
the totality of the circumstances test remains more effective because it pro-
vides the court with the most flexibility in crafting its decisions.127
124. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (stating “courts may consider a number
of factors” when evaluating bad faith); see also Haithcock & Goodrich, supra note
107 (observing totality of the circumstances approach is difficult test on which to
rely because “creditors rarely know . . . whether [individuals] will later determine
that they are motivated by malice or ill will”); Nathan & Chafetz, supra note 120, at
3 (“The court’s adoption of a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test when analyzing
bad faith will make it very difficult for a petitioning creditor to know in advance
whether its conduct rises to the level of bad faith.”).  For a further discussion of the
factors the court will consider during its review, see supra note 98 and accompany-
ing text.
125. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (detailing “fact-intensive review” con-
ducted by court under totality of the circumstances standard); see also Debra McEl-
ligott, No Bad Blood in the Bankruptcy Court: Third Circuit Holds That Bad Faith Is a
Basis for Dismissing Involuntary Petitions, BANKR. BLOG, (Weil, New York, NY) (Oct.
23, 2015), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/involuntary-petitions/
no-bad-blood-in-the-bankruptcy-court-third-circuit-holds-that-bad-faith-is-a-basis-for
-dismissing-involuntary-petitions/ [https://perma.cc/Y669-G8F8] (explaining gray
area in bankruptcy law still exists because “the fact-based nature of the bad faith
inquiry makes the reach of the ruling unclear”).
126. See Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir.
1988) (“[T]he bankruptcy court should examine the totality of the circumstances,
balancing the interests of the debtor with those of the creditors.”); see also In re
Smith, 243 B.R. 169, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999) (recognizing need for flexible
approach that weighs variety of factors).
127. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335–36 (describing standards other courts
have used to evaluate bad faith).  The improper use standard sets forth a test that
has less ambiguity than the totality of the circumstances standard because it simply
asks whether “a petitioning creditor uses involuntary bankruptcy procedures in an
attempt to obtain a disproportionate advantage for itself . . . .” See id. at 335 (quot-
ing K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. at 179 n.14) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The
improper purpose standard is also clearer than the totality of the circumstances
standard because it simply looks to see if the creditor was “‘motivated by ill will,
malice,’” or retribution. See id. (quoting Lubow Machine Co. v. Bayshore Wire
Prods. Corp. (In re Bayshore Wire Prods. Corp.), 209 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2000))
(explaining improper purpose test); see also In re Smith, 243 B.R. at 190 (noting
totality of the circumstances standard “gives the [c]ourt considerable discretion
and leeway”).  Further, Congress intended the standard adopted by courts to de-
cide whether bad faith exists “to be applied with flexibility so as not to limit or
restrict the involuntary process.” See In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 407–08
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (adopting “generally not paying” test and acknowledging
that Congress intended test chosen by courts to be flexible).  The totality of the
circumstances approach causes courts to weigh and analyze the most factors be-
cause it is an “amalgam of tests used by other courts.” See In re Diamondhead
Casino, 2016 WL 3284674, at *16 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
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V. BANKING ON MEETING THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD: PRACTICAL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
PRACTITIONERS
Involuntary bankruptcies are closely analyzed by courts and present
an enormous challenge for practitioners.128  After Forever Green, Third Cir-
cuit creditors not only bear the burden of proving the requirements of
§§ 303 (b) and (h) are met, but must also prove the petition was filed in
good faith under the totality of the circumstances standard.129  Con-
versely, the decision arms debtors with an alternative basis for dismissal if
they can show a petition was filed in bad faith.130
A. Caution to Creditors
Forever Green imposes a significant additional burden on creditors try-
ing to recover their money, as well as a heavy penalty if a petition is filed
for improper reasons.131  With a higher burden, creditors’ lawyers should
now scrutinize all the facts and motivations surrounding the involuntary
petition even if the statutory requirements of §§ 303(b) and (h) are
met.132  If there are factors present that suggest the petition was filed pri-
128. See In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting court chose to
“scrutinize carefully the creditor’s filing” because of serious potential conse-
quences involuntary petitions have on debtors); see also Godshall & Giluhy, supra
note 117, at 1317–18 (warning of heavy court scrutiny of involuntary bankruptcy).
Even though the requirements of involuntary bankruptcies are clearly laid out in
§ 303, “[c]ompliance with the requirements . . . is absolutely critical as the bank-
ruptcy court has broad discretion to compensate an alleged debtor and punish a
petitioning creditor if the court determines that the involuntary petition was im-
properly filed.” See id. at 1317 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2012)) (discussing im-
portance filing involuntary bankruptcy petition in good faith); see also Nathan &
Chafetz supra note 120, at 3 (acknowledging challenges faced during involuntary
bankruptcy by creditors due to “need to conduct appropriate due diligence”).
129. See Stickles & Reilley, supra note 8, at *30 (noting burden of proof to
establish requirements is on creditor); see also Gotaskie, supra note 15 (recognizing
Third Circuit’s acceptance of totality of the circumstances standard to review bad
faith with Forever Green).
130. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 334–35 (permitting dismissal of involuntary
petition for bad faith); see also Nathan & Chafetz, supra note 120 (noting Third
Circuit’s dismissal due to bad faith exacerbates challenges faced by creditors in
involuntary bankruptcies); see also Barry M. Klayman, Third Circuit Affirms Bad Faith
Involuntary Bankruptcy Dismissal, Increasing Risk of Punitive Damages, BANKR., INSOL-
VENCY & RESTRUCTURING ALERT (Cozen O’Connor, Wilmington, Del.) (Oct. 20,
2015), https://www.cozen.com/news-resources/publications/2015/3rd-circuit-af
firms-bad-faith-involuntary-bankruptcy-dismissal-increasing-risk-of-punitive-damag
es [https://perma.cc/4Q6B-YG2K] (detailing additional way for debtors to chal-
lenge involuntary petition due to Forever Green decision).
131. See Gotaskie, supra note 15 (acknowledging “substantial” evidence is re-
quired under totality of the circumstances test); see also Block-Lieb supra note 26, at
846 (detailing collection challenges faced by creditors by explaining “the filing of a
petition is a particularly ineffective means of coercing repayment of an individual
debtor’s obligations”).
132. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 333–35 (allowing bad faith dismissal even
though creditor met statutory requirements); see also Klayman supra note 130 (“It is
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marily to serve as an individual’s debt-collection device, practitioners
should “ensure there are counterbalancing collective factors that benefit
all creditors,” such as the debtor making preferential payments to another
creditor or the debtor willfully not paying certain debts.133  Additionally, if
a creditor’s motivations point to bad faith, practitioners need to engage in
“appropriate due diligence” by analyzing all creditors’ motivations for fil-
ing before filing the petition.134  The determination of bad faith is ulti-
mately up to the bankruptcy court; however, Forever Green provides factors
the court will review in making its decision that practitioners can consider
before filing a petition.135
Forever Green also presents the possibility of punitive damages against
both creditors and their counselors if a petition is dismissed for bad
faith.136  If a variety of bad faith factors are present, practitioners should
utilize other collection avenues.137  For example, instead of bankruptcy
no longer sufficient to merely determine that a fellow petitioning creditor holds a
claim against a debtor that is not contingent as to liability or subject to a bona fide
dispute.”).
133. See Gotaskie, supra note 15 (detailing creditor’s need for good faith pur-
pose for filing involuntary petitions).  When considering filing a bad faith petition,
the creditor’s practitioner needs to review the facts and motivations “to en-
sure . . . there are . . . at worst[,] neutral reasons for the filing.” See id. (describing
precautions creditors should take when filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions in
Third Circuit in wake of Forever Green); Klayman supra note 130 (explaining pres-
suring debtor to prioritize lower creditor’s claim inappropriately over other credi-
tors’ claims serves as factor for bad faith filing); see also Mark A. Salzberg, Creditors
Be Forewarned: Involuntary Petitions Carry Substantial Risk, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=CD606c74-3a10-4
3f8-885e-86a488ef2755 [https://perma.cc/C2Q9-8K7U] (explaining “[p]revent-
ing preferential payments” can serve as legitimate basis for filing involuntary
petition).
134. See Nathan & Chafetz, supra note 120 (noting challenge faced by credi-
tors to perform due diligence in an attempt to ensure no creditors’ “conduct rises
to the level of bad faith”); see also Klayman supra note 130 (explaining creditors
“now must concern themselves with determining the subjective motivation of their
fellow creditors”).
135. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336; see also In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d
Cir. 1996) (remanding case to bankruptcy court to determine existence of bad
faith).  See supra note 98 and accompanying text for factors court will review in
determining whether bad faith exists under the totality of the circumstances
standard.
136. See Gotaskie, supra note 15 (discussing possibility of punitive damages
awarded against debtors and debtors’ counsel); see also Block-Lieb infra note 26, at
829 (noting debtors can be awarded actual and punitive damages resulting from
filing if bad faith is proven); Stickles & Reilley, supra note 8, at 31 (highlighting
that attorneys’ fees can be awarded in addition to damages).
137. See Michael L. Cook, Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Good Involuntary Peti-
tion for Bad Faith, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.
srz.com/Third_Circuit_Affirms_Dismissal_of_Good_Involuntary_Petition_for_Bad
_Faith/ [https://perma.cc/7LAK-88WS] (acknowledging other collection avenues
using non-bankruptcy courts “may be more effective”); see also Gebelt, supra note
30 (“[A]bsent exigent circumstances it is probably safer to use to use some other
approach to debt collection.”).
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court, practitioners can pursue debt collection in state court.138  Addition-
ally, because state court collection alternatives are not a collective creditor
remedy, successful creditors can collect their debt without “shar[ing] [the
recovery] with other creditors.”139
B. Defense for Debtors
While Forever Green created extra hurdles for creditors in recovering
their money, the court also interpreted § 303 in a way that provides a
strong defense strategy for debtors’ attorneys in the Third Circuit.140
Practitioners should fully consider the creditor’s motivations behind filing
and should petition for a bad faith dismissal when possible.141  Further-
more, Forever Green showed that the Third Circuit will heavily scrutinize a
creditor’s motivations to ensure good faith exists.142  The presumption of
good faith in involuntary bankruptcies remains; however, the totality of
the circumstances standard provides practitioners with a large arsenal of
possible challenges to this presumption.143  Additionally, because Forever
Green emphasized the importance of “due diligence and sober decision-
making,” debtors’ practitioners can use this added requirement as lever-
age to settle, prevent creditors from filing involuntary petitions, or as po-
tential grounds for dismissal.144  Debtors’ counselors should carefully use
138. See Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock), 772
F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1985) (characterizing state court as alternative collection
avenue).
139. See Cook, supra note 137 (explaining that non-bankruptcy alternatives to
debt collection may be more effective option for creditor).  All bankruptcy court
collections are shared equally among creditors, but state-court collections enable a
creditor to collect a debt without “shar[ing] [the collection] with other creditors.”
See id.
140. See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir.
2015) (affirming dismissal of involuntary petition filed in bad faith).
141. See id. at 336 (noting totality of the circumstances standard takes into
account both objective and subjective evidence of bad faith); see also Klayman supra
note 130 (highlighting importance of evaluating subjective motivations of all credi-
tors filing involuntary petition).
142. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 334–35 (detailing court’s deference to
proper purposes and policy considerations for involuntary bankruptcy petitions).
143. See In re Smith, 243 B.R. 169, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999) (citing In re
CLE Corp., 59 B.R. 579, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986)) (acknowledging “presump-
tion that petitioning creditors act in good faith”); see also Forever Green, 804 F.3d at
336 (providing potential factors to prove bad faith exists); see also Gotaskie, supra
note 15 (highlighting that any challenge suggesting bad faith made by debtor is
troubling for creditor because “evidence needed to prove the new totality of the
circumstances test appears to be quite substantial”); Salzberg, supra note 133 (ex-
plaining debtor may be able to challenge petition for bad faith if debtor can prove
petition was filed “to leverage a creditor’s position in ongoing litigation”).
144. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 337 (emphasizing “due diligence and sober
decision-making”); see also Klayman, supra note 130 (“For debtors, it provides . . . a
strong argument to forestall the filing of such a petition in the elaborate dance
that often proceeds a filing.”).
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the flexibility provided by the totality of the circumstances standard to the
fullest.145
VI. CONCLUSION
Forever Green showcases the Third Circuit’s precedential stance on bad
faith in involuntary bankruptcy petitions due to the ramifications of such
petitions.146  The court heightened the implicit requirements of involun-
tary bankruptcies and articulated the standard for determining bad
faith.147  The Third Circuit’s decision to utilize the totality of the circum-
stances standard also highlighted the court’s desire to defend against all
potential bad faith filings.148  Ultimately, the Third Circuit may experi-
ence a drop in involuntary petitions filed because even creditors who meet
the explicit statutory requirements stated in § 303 may now be hesitant to
file.149  However, despite this higher protection for debtors and the new
defenses debtors can assert in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, debt-
ors in the Third Circuit need to keep a watchful eye on creditors, as credi-
tors are sure to develop new strategies to evade the totality of the
circumstances standard and get their hands into a debtor’s piggybank.150
145. See In re Smith, 243 B.R. at 190 (discussing flexibility of totality of the
circumstances standard).  Because the totality of the circumstances test contains
both objective and subjective factors, this standard provides practitioners with the
ability to petition for dismissal even if one of the factors is missing. See Forever
Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (describing totality of the circumstances test as consisting of
both subjective and objective factors); see also Klayman, supra note 130 (finding
subjective motivation of any one individual creditor may cause finding of bad
faith); Salzberg, supra note 133 (explaining subjective factors of creditors may con-
stitute “a basis for dismissal even if § 303(b)’s objective criteria are met”).
146. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 335 (noting “serious consequences” of invol-
untary petitions).
147. See In re Diamondhead Casino Corp., 540 B.R. 499, 507 (Bankr. D. Del.
2015) (referring to Forever Green decision when stating “totality of the circum-
stances” standard is used to evaluate bad faith).
148. See Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 336 (characterizing totality of the circum-
stances standard as “most suitable for evaluating the myriad ways in which creditors
filing an involuntary petition could act in bad faith”).
149. See Gotaskie, supra note 15 (noting potential deterring effect of Forever
Green).  Gotaskie notes that in the wake of Forever Green, creditors may be “very
nervous about actually filing an involuntary petition.” See id.
150. See id. (acknowledging new defense to involuntary bankruptcy); see also
Cook, supra note 137 (noting creditors may evade totality of the circumstances
inquiry entirely by pursuing claims that normally would be litigated in bankruptcy
court in venues other than bankruptcy court).
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